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Abstract—YouTube draws large number of users who con-
tribute actively by uploading videos or commenting on existing
videos. However, being a crowd sourced and large content pushed
onto it, there is limited control over the content. This makes
malicious users push content (videos and comments) which is
inappropriate (unsafe), particularly when such content is placed
around cartoon videos which are typically watched by kids. In
this paper, we focus on presence of unsafe content for children
and users who promote it. For detection of child unsafe content
and its promoters, we perform two approaches, one based on
supervised classification which uses an extensive set of video-
level, user-level and comment-level features and another based
Convolutional Neural Network using video frames. Detection
accuracy of 85.7% is achieved which can be leveraged to build a
system to provide a safe YouTube experience for kids. Through
detailed characterization studies, we are able to successfully
conclude that unsafe content promoters are less popular and
engage less as compared with other users. Finally, using a
network of unsafe content promoters and other users based on
their engagements (likes, subscription and playlist addition) and
other factors, we find that unsafe content is present very close to
safe content and unsafe content promoters form very close knit
communities with other users, thereby further increasing the
likelihood of a child getting getting exposed to unsafe content.
I. INTRODUCTION
YouTube is the most popular video sharing platform on the
web. It enjoys a global 2nd rank among websites viewed in
the world as of today.1 According to the statistics released
by YouTube [1], the user base of YouTube is over a billion
users and 400 hrs of viewable content is getting uploaded in 60
seconds [2]. YouTube provides ease of publishing and is highly
leveraged by content producers to host their video content on
YouTube. Consequently, a wide variety of content is posted on
YouTube and watched by users across all age groups [3]. Our
work focusses on cartoon videos which are typically watched
by children. Various cartoon production houses have uploaded
their trademark cartoon series on YouTube for wider publicity
and brand building. Figure 1a depicts one such cartoon video
which clearly indicate that such cartoon videos receive large
view counts and thus are widely watched. This large audience,
typically in the lower age group, has very less experience of
nuances and subtleties that Internet has to offer. Being a crowd
sourced platform, YouTube, is no exception to users with
1http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/youtube.com
malicious intent who are often found indulging in spamming
and promotional activities. In the context of these children,
the most disruptive behaviour by malicious users is to expose
them to inappropriate content, Figure 1b is one such example.
Unsafe content on YouTube is contributed either in form of
indecent videos published by unsafe uploaders or in form
of abusive/inappropriate words in comments post by unsafe
commenters. We refer such uploaders and commenters in our
paper as child unsafe content promoters. An otherwise safe
video page can be rendered as inappropriate due to presence of
abusive comments, as shown in Figure 1c. For the purpose of
our work, indecent videos are those which either have graphic
nudity or abusive/inappropriate dialogues. Table I depicts all
possible scenarios of publishing of unsafe content.
TABLE I
ALL POSSIBLE COMBINATIONS OF USER BEHAVIOUR, HERE ‘1’
REPRESENTS AN UNSAFE BEHAVIOUR WHILE ‘0’ REPRESENTS A SAFE
BEHAVIOUR.
Video Comment User Behaviour
0 0 Safe Uploads & Safe Comments
0 1 Safe Uploads & Unsafe Comments
1 0 Unsafe Uploads & Safe Comments
1 1 Unsafe Uploads & Unsafe Comments
Motivation: There have been a number of articles indicating
the issue of unsafe content on YouTube, one of them claiming
that kids are three clicks away from adult content on YouTube
[4] and another suggesting that children are at a higher risk
of accessing adult content on YouTube [5]. YouTube tried to
address these concerns through YouTube Kids App [6]. How-
ever, it was based on user feedback (viewer flagging unsafe
content), which could be manipulated. This solution could not
provide expected results and consumer groups reported to FTC
that it still has inappropriate content [7] which YouTube later
assured would be addressed in future updates [8].
Key Contributions: We summarize our contributions as
three fold. First, we provide two approaches to detect unsafe
content promoters (Section IV). One uses machine learning
based supervised classification model based on an extensive
feature set at the level of video, user and comments. Second
builds a Convolutional Neutral Network based deep learning
model using features from the video frames. Second, we
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Fig. 1. (a) A famous cartoon character ‘Mickey Mouse’, example of cartoon video on YouTube which is safe for children, it is widely watched as indicated
through the large view count of 26,656,932. (b) Example of cartoon video which depicts visual nudity and is unsafe for children, such videos can be found
easily on YouTube. (c) Example of unsafe comments on otherwise safe video.
perform a detailed comparative characterization study (Section
V) of unsafe content promoter behaviour and engagements
received by them with other users spreading safe content
and find distinguishing patterns. Third, using network analysis
(Section VI), we show that transition of a YouTube user
(typically a child in our case) watching a decent video to
an indecent video is highly likely. Further, we model unsafe
content promoters and other users as a graph built using
their behaviours of likes, subscription and playlist. We then
apply community detection algorithms to unravel closely knit
communities of unsafe content promoters with normal users.
II. RELATED WORK
We discuss some key indicative research problems and
challenges on YouTube that have been investigated related to
the problem under study.
A. Detection of Inappropriate Content on YouTube
Detection of inappropriate video content (pornographic)
by combining image features with motion information was
studied by Jansohn et. al. [9] in which motion extracted in
the form of MPEG-4 motion vectors was used. Ochoa et. al.
[10] used spatial and temporal cinematographic features from
video to build machine learning classifiers to perform binary
classification of videos into adult and non-offensive. In our
work too we followed the path of using video frame and image
processing based features in one of our approaches based on
Convolutional Neural Network.
B. Detection of malicious user behaviour
Being a crowd sourced platform, users often are found to
exhibit malicious behaviour on YouTube. One work to detect
spammers and content promoters was done by Benevenuto et.
al. [11] in which authors manually annotated a set of YouTube
users as spammers, promoters and legitimate users. This was
followed by characterization and use of classification algo-
rithms for categorizing a user into these categories. Our work
draws methodological insights from their work. However, our
work is focussed on the issue of unsafe content promotion in
respect to cartoon videos in contrast to their work which looks
at spammers and promoters in general. Another closely related
problem of identification of fraudulent promotion of videos
was addressed by Bulakh et. al. [12] in which measurement
studies were performed to distinguish fraudulent promoters
from legitimate users which was followed by development of
supervised machine learning models to differentiate legitimate
users from those indulging in fraudulent promotion. Spam
campaigns in YouTube is another interesting problem studied
by Callaghan et. al. [14] who observed broadly two spam
strategies. One strategy worked by small group of users com-
menting on large set of videos and another worked by large
group of users commenting on small set of videos. Sureka et.
al. [13] investigated spamming activity in the comments posted
on YouTube videos and presented an empirical analysis of
comments obtained from YouTube and finally proposed a rule
based classification method to detect spammers in comment
activities. Our work also looks at comments but we do it
from the point of view of detection of inappropriate words
in it and study the relationship between commenters and
uploaders of videos. Works of Agarwal et. al. [15] and Sureka
et. al. [16] address the problem of mining and extracting hate
and extremism videos on YouTube, but they were studied to
understand the retrieval approaches being followed to obtain
the desired set of videos on YouTube platform.
III. BACKGROUND
In this section we describe our problem statement and then
discuss data collection and approaches adopted for building
the ground truth.
A. Problem Statement
More formally, we state the three problems being addressed
in this paper as follows.
Detection Problem: Given a set of seed cartoon videos V ,
their corresponding set of uploaders U who upload those
videos and commenters C who post comments on those
videos, the goal is to find (identify) a subset of uploaders
Uunsafe and commenters Cunsafe promoting unsafe content.
fidentification(U,C)→ {Uunsafe, Cunsafe}
Characterization Problem: Given a set of unsafe content
uploaders Uunsafe and safe content uploaders Usafe, the goal
is to find the set of attributes of uploaders that distinguish
them from each other to the maximum extent.
fcharacterization(Usafe, Uunsafe)→ {Uattributes . . . }
Community Detection Problem: Given sets of safe and un-
safe content promoters, both in terms of video uploads (Usafe
and Uunsafe) and commenter posts (Csafe and Cunsafe), the
goal is to find (detect) communities within the set of uploaders
U (among Usafe & Uunsafe), within set of commenters C
(among Csafe & Cunsafe) and across the set of uploaders &
commenters.
B. Data Collection
YouTube provides a platform for a huge repository of video
content and engagements (likes, views , dislikes, comments,
etc) around it. In lieu of our focus on content being watched
by kids, we restricted ourselves to collection of cartoon videos
only. We began searching and collecting videos using top 20
popular cartoon keywords (few indicative ones like mickey
mouse, tom and jerry, etc.) programmatically through YouTube
Data API.2 From the search results, we randomly selected 408
videos which formed our seed input. Users who have uploaded
these videos, referred as uploaders, were found to be 275. For
each video, upto 100 latest comments were collected, which
commutatively added up to 21,268 comments in total, which
were found to be posted by 19,099 unique users, referred as
commenters. Table II summarizes the data collected. This seed
video dataset was further expanded to 1,178 videos liked by
these uploaders & 123,390 videos liked by these commenters,
1,293 uploaders subscribed by these uploaders & 131,952
uploaders subscribed by these commenters and 1,068 videos
added to playlist by these uploaders & 30,148 videos added
to playlist by these commenters.
More than 80% of uploaders in the seed dataset contributes
only one video in the seed video dataset and similarly around
90% of commenters in the seed dataset makes only one
comment.
C. Building Ground Truth
All the seed videos that were collected using Cartoon
keywords through the YouTube API were manually inspected
(annotated) for presence (‘1’) or absence (‘0’) of unsafe
2https://developers.google.com/youtube/v3/
TABLE II
SUMMARY OF DATA COLLECTED COMPRISING OF SEED DATASET
COLLECTED USING CARTOON KEYWORDS AND AN EXTENDED DATASET
OBTAINED THROUGH ENGAGEMENTS OF UPLOADERS AND COMMENTERS
Description of Data Count
Seed Data Set (Cartoon Keywords)
Number of Seed Videos 408
Number of Unique Seed Uploaders 275
Number of Seed Comments 21,286
Number of Unique Seed Commenters 19,099
Extended Data Set (Engagements)
Number of Extended Videos 155,784
- Videos liked by Uploaders 1,178
- Videos liked by Commenters 123,390
- Videos added to playlist by Uploaders 1,068
- Videos added to playlist by Commenters 30,148
Number of Extended Uploaders 133,245
- Uploaders subscribed by Seed Uploader 1,293
- Uploaders subscribed by Seed Commenters 131,952
content in video either in form of graphic nudity or abusive
words spoken in dialogues. Out of the total 408 seed videos,
284 were found to be safe and remaining 124 videos were
found to be unsafe for viewing by kids. With respect to the
comments, we treat each comment as bag of words separated
by spaces. We compared each word from the comment text
with a set of bad words obtained from an online repository.3
Out of 21,268 comments, 1814 comments were found to have
atleast one bad word.
IV. DETECTION OF UNSAFE CONTENT PROMOTERS
In this section we explain our solution to the first problem of
detection of unsafe content promoters. Such promoters mani-
fest their malicious activities in two forms, first, by uploading
indecent videos (unsafe content uploaders) and second, by
posting indecent comments (unsafe content commenters).
A. Detecting Unsafe Content Uploaders
For identifying unsafe content uploaders, we adopt two
independent approaches. One approach, referred a classifier
approach uses features that capture responses of other users
in a crowd sourced environment. Features at the level of
video, user and comments are used. In the other, referred as
CNN based approach, features from the actual video are used,
details are provided below.
Classifier Approach: In this, we aim to build a classifier
model to automatically mark users (uploaders) as unsafe or
safe based on three types of features namely video-level, user-
level and comment-level which are explained in Table III,
numbers below in brackets refer to number of features used.
Video-Level Features (19): These capture the cumulative
response received from YouTube users in form of view count,
comment count, like count and dislike count to the past upto
100 videos uploaded by the uploader. In addition, few other
features associated with video included are video duration,
length of title, length of description, description to title ratio,
jaccard similarity between title and description, bad words
3Bad Word List: https://www.cs.cmu.edu/b˜iglou/resources/bad-words.txt
found in title and description, number of question marks,
hyperlinks and emoticons found in description.
User-Level Features (9): These include the user’s profile
related features like total number of videos uploaded, total
views & comments received on those videos, number of
subscriptions, number of days since joining YouTube and
length of title & description. In addition, there are features
associated with YouTube user’s Google+ userID namely cir-
cledByCount (number of other users in the network of user)
and plusOneCount (number of likes received by user) which
are also used.4
Comment-Level Features (6): These capture the response of
other users through the comments that they have been posting
on videos uploaded by the user. Features related to comments
used are cumulative likes and replies received by comments,
number of positive, neutral and negative sentiment received on
comments by the user and number of bad words in comments.
TABLE III
EXHAUSTIVE LIST OF FEATURES (VIDEO-LEVEL, USER-LEVEL AND
COMMENT-LEVEL) USED FOR BUILDING A CLASSIFICATION MODEL FOR
DETECTION OF UNSAFE CONTENT PROMOTERS IN YOUTUBE
Feature Description
Video Level Features (computed for upto 100 videos uploaded)
type of video, number of views received on videos, number of comments
posted on videos, number of dislikes obtained on videos, number of likes
received on videos, ratio of number of likes to dislikes, length of title
of videos, length of video description, ratio of description to title of
videos, video duration in seconds, number of days since video was
published, jaccard similarity between words appearing in description
and title, number of bad words in title, number of bad words in
description, number of times ‘?’ appears in description, number of times
hyperlink appears in description, number of emoticons in description,
presence or absence of ‘18’ in video title, common words in title and
description of video.
User Level Features (computed for YouTube Channel & Google+ userID)
total number of videos uploaded, total number of views received on all
videos uploaded, total number of comments posted on all videos
uploaded, number of subscribers of the user, length of user’s title,
length of user’s description, number of days since the user registered
with YouTube, number of Google+ users in the network of the user,
number of likes received from other Google+ users by the user.
Comment Level Features (computed for upto 50 top comments per video)
likes received on comments posted on videos uploaded by user, number
of replies made to the comments, number of comments with positive
sentiment, number of comments with negative sentiment, number of
comments with neutral sentiment, number of bad words in comments.
We apply a number of conventional classifiers (IV) on these
features which are computed for the seed videos dataset as
input with 80:20 training to test split and found that random
forest classifier performs the best with respect to accuracy
in predicting the class (safe or unsafe) of an input video.
The classifier, thus developed, was used to predict the safety
(classs of video whether decent or indecent) of upto 50
latest videos uploaded for each of the unique uploader in
the seed dataset. Algorithm 1 describes the entire process
of identifying unsafe content uploaders using video classifier.
After applying Algorithm 1, it was observed that there are
some users (uploaders) who have uploaded both decent and
4Google+ API: https://developers.google.com/+/web/api/rest/
indecent videos, a cumulative distribution frequency (CDF)
plot of proportion of indecent (unsafe) videos to total videos
uploaded by users is depicted in Figure 2. This plot helps us
in choosing a thresholds to mark an uploader as unsafe or safe
based on the amount of unsafe (indecent) videos uploaded by
them.
Algorithm 1: Detect-Unsafe-Promoter-By-Classifier (V )
1: V ← set of seed videos
2: for all v ∈ Vu do
3: Vf ← find features at level(video, user, comment)
4: end for
5: Cv ← video classifier(Vf )
6: UV ← set of unique uploaders of V
7: for all u ∈ UV do
8: Vu ← find past uploaded videos(u)
9: for all v ∈ Vu do
10: vlabel ← Cv.predict(v)
11: end for
12: end for
TABLE IV
RESULTS OF CLASSIFIERS FOR PREDICTING VIDEO SAFETY
Classifier Name Feature List Precision Recall Accuracy
Random Forest
Video-Level 83.3 66.6 82.9
User-Level 62.5 47.6 65.3
Comment-Level 60.0 60.0 70.7
All Features 88.8 76.1 85.7
K-Nearest Neighbor
Video-Level 57.1 13.3 64.6
User-Level 75.0 28.5 65.3
Comment-Level 80.0 26.6 70.7
All Features 66.6 47.6 67.3
Decision Tree
Video-Level 77.2 56.6 78.0
User-Level 46.4 43.3 60.9
Comment-Level 44.8 43.3 59.7
All Features 68.1 71.4 73.4
Fig. 2. Ratio of Indecent Videos to Total Videos by Uploaders obtained after
applying Algorithm 1 to upto 50 latest videos uploaded by the seed uploaders
In reference to the Figure 2, we detect unsafe content
uploaders and categorize them into extreme, high and mod-
erate content promoters depending upon the degree of unsafe
content in form of child unsafe videos uploaded by them in
the past.
CNN based approach: In this approach we use the video
frames and apply the concept of deep learning through Con-
volutional Neural Networks (CNN). The approach is based
on the hypothesis that unsafe video would have transitions
(either abrupt or gradual) arising due to the scenes which
are depicting nudity in the video. Process of finding these
transitions in a video is explained next. Key frames involving
abrupt transitions (based on the visual similarity of neighbour-
ing frames of the video) from each video are first extracted.
The descriptive efficiency of both SURF (Speeded Up Ro-
bust Features) and HSV (Hue, Saturation, Value) histograms
descriptors are exploited for assessing frame similarity. More
specifically, these abrupt transitions are initially detected be-
tween successive video frames where there is a sharp change
and thereafter the calculated scores are further analysed for the
identification of frame sequences where a progressive change
of the visual content takes place and in this way gradual
transitions are detected as well. Finally, a post-processing
step is performed to identify outliers due to object/camera
movement and flash lights. We implement a CNN to detect
the dissimilar image in a video frame. CNN comprises of an
input layer, two convolutional layers, two sampling layers,
five kernels each of size 3x3 in convolutional layer, mean
filter of 2x2 in sampling layer, one fully connected layer and
target output layer. The five kernels use five different feature
maps namely gray, gradient-X, gradient-Y and last two kernels
have randomly initialized values. This approach was found to
detect unsafe video with 74% accuracy which is less than the
accuracy obtained using the earlier approach. It was further
observed that this approach is computationally expensive since
it involves video processing on frame-by-frame basis. Due to
low accuracy and high computational cost, this approach was
not pursued further.
B. Detecting Unsafe Content Commenters
Since there is no way in which a user’s past comments could
be retrieved through the YouTube API, so a user is marked
as unsafe (indecent) commenter if he or she has posted at
least one comment which carries indecent words. Out of 21268
comments, 1814 comments were found to have atleast one bad
word which were posted by 1755 unique users, all such users
were marked as unsafe content commenters for the purpose of
our work.
V. UPLOADER CHARACTERIZATION STUDY
After having identified unsafe content uploaders, in this
section, we characterize these uploaders with respect to the
popularity and engagements received on the videos uploaded
by them. The goal is find distinguishing features which sep-
arates unsafe content promoters from those spreading safe
content for kids.
A. Popularity Factors
Popularity is an important factor to characterize and distin-
guish unsafe content uploaders from safe content uploaders.
In context of YouTube, popularity can be gauged by various
factors whose characterization study is depicted in Figure
3 comprising subscriber count, circledByCount, total videos
count and total view count received on all the videos uploaded
by the user. Number of subscribers to a YouTube channel is
one of the key indicators of popularity of the uploader. Figure
3a depicts that unsafe content uploaders have a comparatively
less number of subscribers than safe content uploaders which
is suggestive of the fact that users subscribe more to those
spreading safe content.
Number of videos uploaded by safe content uploaders are
more than those uploaded by unsafe content uploaders as
depicted in Figure 3d which indicates that users spreading
unsafe content are not inclined towards maintaining a long
standing profile through their video content on YouTube.
Viewership trends for safe content uploaders is higher than
that of unsafe content uploaders as per Figure 3b, which could
perhaps be due to the fact the unsafe content uploaders upload
less videos as well. Finally, each uploader represented as a
YouTube Channel is typically managed through a Google+
account whose network is studied in Figure 3c which shows
that unsafe content uploaders have a lessor users in their
network (circle) as compared to those spreading safe content
which is in coherence with other popularity metrics studied.
B. Engagement Factors
To further understand the key distinguishing features that
separates safe content uploaders from unsafe content upload-
ers, we study engagements. For capturing engagements three
factors namely comments, likes and dislikes received on past
videos posted by uploaders are compared in Figure 4.
Comments, likes and dislikes received on videos uploaded
by the safe and unsafe content uploader are depicted in Figure
4a, Figure 4b and Figure 4c, respectively. In all of them
the engagements received by safe content uploaders is higher
than unsafe content promoters suggesting that users (who are
typically kids) engage more with those spreading safe content.
VI. COMMUNITY DETECTION
After having characterized the popularity and engagement of
safe and unsafe content uploaders, in this section, we perform
network based analysis to understand the underlying inter-
connected structures among the uploaders and commenters
on YouTube spreading safe and unsafe content. The purpose
is to detect communities among the safe and unsafe content
promoters (both in respect to uploaders and commenters).
These communities would help us in understanding whether
safe content promoters are closely knit with the unsafe content
promoters. If it is so then such community structures could
end up driving kids moving (or viewing) from safe content
promotion space to a space comprising of unsafe content
promoters, as would be argued in this section later. Three ways
of detecting such communities are explained next.
A. Video Network Analysis
In our first approach for detecting communities, related
videos feature of YouTube is leveraged to find a list of videos
(a) Subscription Count (b) Viewership (c) Google+ Network (d) Uploaded Video Count
Fig. 3. Characterization of Safe and Unsafe Content Uploaders based on their Popularity Metrics
(a) Comment Count (b) Like Count (c) Dislike Count
Fig. 4. Characterization of Safe and Unsafe Content Uploaders based on their Engagement Metrics
that are suggested for an given input video. We use this feature
to find video-video communities based on these suggested
(related) videos by using YouTube API.5 We construct a
directed graph comprising of videos as nodes, in which a
directed edge between two videos vi and vj is formed if vj
is found to be related to vi. Algorithm 2 constructs the graph
by taking the seed videos dataset as input. For each video,
algorithm finds top 10 related videos. If the related video is
from among the set of seed videos dataset, then an edge is
added in the graph. Procedure update transitions counts all
possible transitions (edges) between safe and unsafe videos in
the graph. From the set of 408 seed videos given as input,
it was found that there are 262 nodes and 630 edges formed
between them.
Algorithm 2 Video-Video-Community-Detect (V )
1: V ← set of seed video dataset
2: for all v ∈ V do
3: G← add node(v)
4: end for
5: th← 10
6: for all v ∈ V do
7: vrelated ← find related videos(v, th)
8: for all vr ∈ vrelated do
9: if vr is a video in V then
10: G← add edge(v, vr)
11: update transitions(v, vr)
12: end if
13: end for
14: end for
5https://developers.google.com/youtube/v3/docs/search/list
Community detection algorithm was run based on the work
of Vincent et. al. [17] provided by Gephi.6 A total of 31 com-
munities with Louvain Modularity value of 0.807 were found
indicating that communities are fairly well connected among
themselves. Figure 5 depicts the four set of transitions among
decent and indecent videos that we intend to capture through
this video-video graph. Table V depicts the distribution of 630
edges (transitions) among decent and indecent videos, thereby
summarizing the results for all possible transitions.
Fig. 5. Possible Video-Video Transitions based on Video Suggestion feature
of YouTube
The implication of this analysis is to suggest that while safe
to unsafe transition is quite a rare (9 and 14 in video-video
and uploader-uploader, respectively) phenomena, the unsafe to
unsafe transition is quite prevalent in the case of video-video
transition where it happens 117 times. This indicates that once
a user (typically a child watching cartoons) moves from decent
6https://gephi.org/
(safe) video space to indecent (unsafe) video space, he or she
would remain in it due to video suggestions. The idea of video-
video transitions is extended to the uploaders as well and an
uploader-uploader graph is constructed on similar lines and
uploader-uploader transitions are also mentioned in Table V.
TABLE V
VIDEO-VIDEO AND UPLOADER-UPLOADER TRANSITIONS AMONG THE
COMMUNITIES FORMED BASED ON VIDEO SUGGESTIONS FEATURE
Description Video-Video Uploader-Uploader
Number of Nodes 262 92
Number of Edges 630 114
Number of Communities 31 21
Modularity 0.807 0.816
Safe to Safe Transition 498 94
Safe to Unsafe Transition 9 14
Unsafe to Safe Transition 6 5
Unsafe to Unsafe Transition 117 1
B. Uploader-Commenter Network Analysis
Besides being a platform for video sharing, users on
YouTube post comments on videos. We leverage this engage-
ment on YouTube to construct uploader-commenter undirected
graph by considering seed uploaders and seed commenters
as nodes (users). An edge between two users is formed
if one user comments on video uploaded by another user.
Due to lack of space, the algorithm for graph construction
is not mentioned. In order to capture only the significant
relationships among commenters and uploaders, we considered
only those commenters who have posted at least 4 comments.
With this change, algorithm resulted in a undirected graph
comprising of 1942 nodes (of commenters and uploaders)
and 2373 edges among them. Running community detection
algorithm on Gephi resulted in 147 communities with Louvain
Modularity value of 0.973 again indicating well connected
communities in the graph. Such a graph between uploaders
(safe and unsafe) and commenters (safe and unsafe) brings
forth many interesting observations. One of them being that
even though an uploader may be quite decent (safe) and has
posted a decent (safe) video, the fact that a commenter posts
an indecent (unsafe) comment, could effectively undermine the
uploader’s safe behavior. Table VI highlights this observation
in which 733 transitions (edges) are found from indecent
(unsafe) commenters on decent (safe) uploaders.
TABLE VI
ENGAGEMENTS BETWEEN COMMENTER UPLOADER OBTAINED THROUGH
COMMENTS MADE ON VIDEOS UPLOADED BY UPLOADERS
Transition Type Count
Safe Commenter to Safe Uploader 396
Unsafe Commenter to Safe Uploader 733
Safe Commenter to Unsafe Uploader 156
Unsafe Commenter to Unsafe Uploader 1088
C. Uploader-Commenter Behavioural Analysis
Commenters and uploaders are also connected with each
other through various other forms of behaviour engagements.
Three types behavioural engagements studied are ‘who likes
whom’, ‘who subscribes whom’ and ‘who adds whom to
playlist’. Communities among safe and unsafe content pro-
moters (uploaders and commenters) formed through the mani-
festation of these behaviours are investigated. It may be noted
here that YouTube API doesn’t provide a direct function to
find list of users who have liked a particular video nor can
we find a list of users who have subscribed a particular user.
In order to find this information, we take a user as input and
first find all the videos liked, all the other users subscribed and
all the videos added in the playlist by this user. We then take
these results and do a reverse lookup to find if any of these
users and videos exist in our seed dataset in order to establish
a behavioural relationship. The detailed procedure for this
approach is not mentioned due to space considerations. With
275 seed uploaders and 19099 seed commenters, Tables VII,
VIII and IX summarize the results of behavioural engagements
among them based on likes, subscription and playlist.
1) Likes Network Community: Self likes of users (uploaders
and commenters) refer to the likes made to videos uploaded
by themselves. As evident from Table VII, 24 out of 275
uploaders (nearly 8%) like videos uploaded by other uploaders
whereas only 604 commenters are connected out of 19098
commenters through likes. Among the others users (referred
as ’Other Users’ because these YouTube channel IDs neither
belong to uploaders nor commenters in our dataset) whose
videos are liked by uploaders and commenters, there are 262
common other users which are liked by both uploaders and
commenters suggesting similar interest between them.
2) Subscriber Network Community: Subscribers are other
YouTube channels that a user typically subscribes to on the
basis on his or her interest. In this section, we collect and
analyze all the subscribers (YouTube channels) subscribed by
uploaders and commenters. Table VIII refers to the related data
and statistics related to the ‘who subscribes whom’ graph and
analysis around it follows next. There are no self-subscribers
since self subscription would not make any sense. Around
10% of uploaders are connected with each other through
subscriptions while only 617 out of 19098 of commenters
are connected with each other. Commenters subscribe to
more number of uploaders while uploaders subscribing to
commenters is very rare.
3) Playlist Network Community: YouTube provides a fea-
ture of adding videos that a user would typically want to
view occasionally and combine such videos into a playlist.
Give a user (YouTube channel ID which is either uploader or
commenter), we can obtain details of all the playlist of that
user. Using this approach, playlists created by all the uploaders
and commenters are collected and analyzed, Table IX presents
a brief summary of the same. Among uploaders, most (757
out of 1068) of the connections are due to uploaders adding
their own uploaded videos in their playlist. Adding videos of
other uploaders and commenters in their playlist is rare. In
contrast among commenters, very few (2148 out of 30148)
videos uploaded by commenters are in their playlist, most of
the videos from other users are in their playlist. Commenters
TABLE VII
WHO ‘LIKES’ WHOM STATISTICS
Description of Behaviour Count
Number of Seed Uploaders 275
Number of Seed Commenters 19,098
Total Videos liked by Uploaders 1,178
- Likes on Videos by Self 186
- Likes on Videos by Other Uploaders 24
- Likes on Videos by Commenters 4
- Likes on Videos by Other Users 964
Total Videos liked by Commenters 123,390
- Likes on Videos by Self 1,111
- Likes on Videos by Other Commenters 604
- Likes on Videos by Uploaders 2,057
- Likes on Videos by Other Users 119,618
TABLE VIII
WHO ‘SUBSCRIBES’ WHOM STATISTICS
Description of Behaviour Count
Number of Seed Uploaders 275
Number of Seed Commenters 19,098
Total Subscription by Uploaders 1,293
- Subscription to Other Uploaders 27
- Subscription to Commenters 3
- Subscription to Other Users 1,263
Total Subscription by Commenters 131,952
- Subscription to Other Commenters 617
- Subscription to Uploaders 2,086
- Subscription to Other Users 129,249
TABLE IX
WHO ADDS WHOM TO ‘PLAYLIST’
STATISTICS
Description of Behaviour Count
Number of Seed Uploaders 275
Number of Seed Commenters 19,098
Total Videos in playlist of Uploaders 1,068
- Self Videos 757
- Videos of Other Uploaders 1
- Videos of Commenters 2
- Videos of Others Users 308
Total Videos in playlist of Commenters 30,148
- Self Videos 2,148
- Videos of Other Commenters 117
- Videos of Uploaders 440
- Videos of Other Users 27,407
and uploaders adds videos from 67 common users belonging
to category of the other users.
4) Combined Network Community: To understand a com-
bined behavioural analysis contributed through likes, subscrip-
tion and playlist, we constructed a graph comprising of all
uploaders and commenters as nodes. An edge is established
between the nodes if they are related either through likes,
subscription or playlist. Figure 6 depicts one of the largest
communities formed in this graph. Nodes in ‘red’ are the
unsafe content promoters (either uploaders or commenters)
and those in ‘blue’ are safe content promoters. One can
clearly visualize closely knit communities among safe and
unsafe content promoters. Since these communities are built on
behaviours, it further reinforces the concern expressed earlier
that a naive user (kid) watching content from a safe content
promoter could easily move into the space of unsafe content
promoters.
Fig. 6. Snapshot of Graph comprising of Safe (’blue’) and Unsafe (’red’)
Content Promoters depicting the large closely knit community between them.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we were able to successfully detect child
unsafe content and its promoters on YouTube. Further, we
characterized such promoters with other users in terms of pop-
ularity and engagement. Finally, we found close communities
of child unsafe promoters with other users.
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